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Abstract
Recent empirical studies suggest insurgencies may be accurately described by
aggregated extrapolation models, such that past behavior becomes the best predictor for
future action. I argue that aggregated extrapolation models possess two flaws that make
it a poor choice for examining insurgencies. First, aggregated extrapolation models ask
the wrong question. The more interesting question is to ask when present action is no
longer explainable by past behavior. Secondly, aggregate models mask changes that a
phenomenon undergoes over time which are only revealed upon disaggregating the data.
Starting with a model and findings provided by Neil Johnson, I use casualty data from the
Iraq War to offer an alternative method to identify changes in the phenomenon under
observation with the addition of no new data. Presenting an alternate set of findings, I
propose it is possible to identify ‘game changer’ events with the introduction of
breakpoints to observe for distinct departures from the baseline trajectory.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2010, American soldiers with the 10th Mountain Division gained a
foothold into a Taliban-controlled area in the northern Afghanistan province of Kunduz.
Anecdotal reports from soldiers involved in the operation relayed accounts from their
Afghan National Army partners entering villages in this once enemy-controlled territory
with tears in their eyes, some returning home for the first time in many years. Upon
completion of the initial clearing operations, the soldiers constructed a combat outpost
(COP) to serve as point of departure for future coalition operations in the area.
While the majority of fighting was accomplished during the initial phase of the
operation, Taliban fighters capable of conducting harassing attacks remained scattered
throughout the area. Within 72 hours of setting up the COP, soldiers reported receiving
indirect fire from enemy mortars. Over the next 48 hours, soldiers reported enemy
mortar fire repeatedly occurred between the hours of 1200-1300z from a location
northwest of the COP. Furthermore, the mortar rounds were impacting closer to the COP
with each attack. The Taliban mortar team was improving their aim. Although no
soldiers had yet been injured by the indirect fire, the commander assessed it was only a
matter of time before the mortars found their mark.
The intelligence team supporting the operation accurately identified the enemy’s
consistent pattern in both time and space for conducting these mortar attacks. Having
extrapolated out what the enemy action was likely to be during the next 24-hour period,
1

the intelligence team supported a mission to position a weapon system in the target area
during the time period in which the Taliban were expected to attack. In this case, past
behavior was the best predictor of future enemy action. Two enemy fighters entered the
area previously identified for enemy mortar attacks and were observed uncovering a
mortar tube hidden in a nearby culvert. At this time, all enemy fighters and the mortar
tube were destroyed before being able to conduct another attack on the US-Afghan COP.1
This story reinforces what has become a conventional approach to understanding
counterinsurgency and is reinforced by recent empirical work.2 Tactical engagements
between insurgents and coalition forces play out as extrapolations until one side
recognizes the pattern and temporarily disrupts the trajectory. But, here is the problem.
The instances that matter most are those when present action is no longer explainable by
past behavior. Elsewhere, these times have been described as strategic surprise.3
In the winter of 2010, also in Kunduz Province, Taliban forces successfully
executed a spectacular attack targeting the Afghan National Army recruiting center

1

Both this incident and the Kunduz Afghan National Army Recruiting center attack are based on personal
observations from author’s deployment to Northern Afghanistan (Regional Command – North) with 1st
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division from March 2010 to February 2011.
2

For further examples of recent empirical approaches to irregular warfare, see “The Science of Civil War:
What Makes Heroic Strife” 2012. See “Cry Havoc! And Let Slips the Maths of War” 2011 for an overview
of Neil Johnson’s Red Queen Hypothesis model discussed in this paper.
3

There are, perhaps, two truisms for strategic surprise when discussing intelligence activities. First, such
surprises are not the absence of information but rather the absence of analysis. Calls for post-mortem
investigations concerning intelligence failures often begin with the question, “how were we taken by
surprise?” During these after-action reviews, much attention is given as to whether available information
could have been sufficiently analyzed to better prepare for the resulting surprise. It is Robert Jervis who
notes intelligence failures are closely observed orphans, important, but “as misunderstood as they are
berated.” The second truism is that surprise is inevitable but responses are optional. How an individual, or
nation, chooses to respond largely plays into the consequences from the inevitable surprise. See Jervis
2010, Handel 1984, Betts 1981.
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located within Kunduz City.4 Suicide bombers attacked the outer perimeter while enemy
fighters temporarily gained control of the recruitment center in the provincial capital.
Previous coalition intelligence assessments had not extrapolated this attack as a likely
scenario based upon past insurgent behavior. Coalition forces did not see this attack
coming based upon observations of previous insurgent activity in the province. Nor
would the recent scholarly literature concerning the empirical study of counterinsurgency
operations have captured the tactical innovations demonstrated by the Taliban forces
during this particular attack in the winter of 2010. At this particular point in time, present
action was no longer explainable by past behavior.
These two stories from Konduz Province capture the host of challenges and
opportunities presented to the United States Armed Forces and Intelligence Community
(IC) over the past ten years of armed conflict across two theaters of operations and global
mission requirements. Assessing likely adversarial action remains central to the ability to
deter and defeat the enemy. Terrorists and insurgents, be they organized networks, local
groups or individuals do not, however, conduct operations in accordance with something
akin to a Soviet order of battle. Herein lies the current challenge. How to properly
forecast the activities of enemy groups and individuals operating independently across
disparate geography?
Meteorologists, seismologists and intelligence analysts face a common set of
challenges across their respective disciplines in modeling future outcomes. Forecasting a
hurricane’s path, the likelihood of future tectonic plate shifts in a given area, and an
impending terrorist attack all rely upon models. Models are formed as representations of
4

This attack is also based upon author’s personal observations. For further reading, see Rivera and Rahimi
2010.
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reality absent those parts deemed irrelevant to the empirical phenomenon under
observation.5
While there exists a host of available forecasting methods, this paper focuses
specifically on aggregated extrapolation models. Extrapolation models are widely used
across disciplines and are considered “reliable, objective, inexpensive, quick, and easily
automated.”6 Aggregated extrapolation models, in particular, are seen as advantageous
for their ability to forecast a smooth trend line less sensitive to the irregularities presented
by individual data points.7 For these reasons and others, forecasting in general and
extrapolation models in particular have become popular policy instruments.8 While
described as a “statistician’s delight,” they are, however, often times wrong.9
This paper begins with presenting two flaws inherent in aggregated extrapolation
models and proceeds to offer one proposed solution. The theoretical assumption driving
all extrapolation models is that past behavior is the best predictor of future action.10 It is,
in effect, to establish a baseline trajectory for a given phenomenon under observation
based upon historic trends. The first flaw is apparent when considering the
policymaker’s dilemma, whose task it is to address circumstances arising from change
while being presented with a tool constructed to convey continuity. Instead, from the

5

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2007, 39-40

6

Armstrong 2001, 217

7

Ibid., 223
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“The Science of Civil War: What Makes Heroic Strife” 2012

9

Armstrong 2001, 218

10

Armstrong 2001, 218
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policymaker’s perspective, the more interesting question is to ask when present action is
no longer explainable by past behavior. In effect, it is to ask how to recognize a ‘game
changer’ before it occurs? Here, ‘game changers’ are those instances where the trajectory
breaks down and present action is no longer explainable by past behavior. The inherent
problem with ‘game changers’ is that their impact only becomes evident after the
phenomenon under observation has undergone change, usually manifesting itself in the
form of a crisis. As equally interesting as the strategic surprise spurred on by the 2011
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya was the completely absent assessment to the
contrary of the established trajectory for these respective regimes.11 Establishing a
baseline trajectory remains a necessary step for understanding normal behavior for a
phenomenon under observation. It is only in establishing this baseline that it then
becomes possible to engage in the more policy-relevant question of identifying
impending change.
The second flaw proposes aggregated extrapolation models mask changes that a
phenomenon undergoes over time which are only revealed upon disaggregating the data.
In short, the aggregation used to present a smooth trend line for the phenomenon under
observation is misleading. Aggregation may occur incidentally or temporally, however,
the impact is the same.12
Here, crime statistics provide a useful illustration. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation reported in 2011 that violent crime across the nation was on a downward

11

Ajami 2012

12

Stephen Shellman brings to light the lack of attention paid within political science to how temporal
aggregation affects results. See Shellman 2004
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trend by 3.8% when compared to the previous year.13 Looking at five- and ten-year
trends, violent crime was down 15.4% from 2007 levels and 15.5% from 2002 levels.14
As such, an extrapolation model for documented violent crimes in the United States
aggregated annually would show a steadily declining trajectory over time. Addressing
the first flaw in aggregated extrapolation models proposed in this paper, this steadily
declining trajectory fails to address the most policy-relevant question for those concerned
with violent crime in the United States. Where in America is violent crime on the rise?
Or, put another way, where is present action not explainable by past behavior?
Addressing the second flaw, disaggregating the incidents of violent crime down to the
state level reveals New Hampshire reported a 12.4% increase in violent crime for 2011.15
Another method for examining violent crimes using the existing data would be to
disaggregate temporally, perhaps down to monthly or weekly data resolution instead of
annually. While this time series data is unavailable through the FBI website, the date of
incident for each violent crime reported is certainly documented. Temporally
disaggregating violent crime data would reveal both annual trending patterns, some
months likely experience more violent incidents than others, as well as ‘game changer’
events. Sudden spikes or drops in violent crime are masked in the temporally aggregated
model, eliminating opportunities to identify changes in the phenomenon under
observation.

13

“Federal Bureau of Investigations: Crime in the United States 2011, Table 4” 2012

14

“Federal Bureau of Investigations: Crime in the United States 2011, Violent Crime” 2012
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“Federal Bureau of Investigations: Crime in the United States 2011, Table 4” 2012
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Recognizing these two inherent flaws for aggregated extrapolation models, this
paper proposes that it is possible to identify changes in the phenomenon’s trajectory,
‘game changers’, before the crisis occurs. It does not attempt to provide the causal
origins for why the phenomenon is changing, the narrative of which is likely unique to
each situation. Instead, this paper offers an alternative method for using existing
aggregated extrapolation models to identify changes in the phenomenon under
observation with the addition of no new data. This last point is significant in that it
suggests that impending ‘game changers’ are identifiable strictly by altering the
extrapolation model’s construction.
This paper will trace the policy, methodological and theoretical implications for
exploring how to recognize a ‘game changer’ in extrapolated models. While the more
complete discussion on a decision-maker’s perception of the world and the operational
environment a given policy will be executed in is addressed elsewhere, it is useful for the
purposes of this paper to focus on the first part of this question.16 Where does a decisionmaker’s perception of the world originated from? Models themselves represent a given
perception of the world, where certain driving forces are amplified at the expense of
others considered irrelevant to the representation of reality being captured. Therefore, the
policy implications for a model, one extrapolated as is the focus for this paper, are
significant for the reasonable belief that they influence the decision-maker’s perception
of the world. The methodological implications are concerned with how the extrapolated
model is constructed. As this paper will demonstrate, it is important to not only identify
which driving forces are relevant to the phenomenon under observation but how they are
16

Jervis 1976, 13-14
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to be structured to act within the model. Theoretical implications will address scholarly
literature on forecasting across illustrative domains and how these writings shape the
understanding for a given phenomenon’s change over time.
Chapter 2 contains a broad overview of the relevant literature on the use of
aggregated extrapolation models across disciplines. Particular attention is given to
meteorology, seismology and strategic intelligence to illustrate the implications brought
forth in how such a model is structured, tested and used. In doing so, different forms of
forecasting will be addressed across disciplines with an emphasis on common challenges
present in each respective field. This chapter will conclude with a discussion on how
recognizing ‘game changers’ as breaks in the established trajectory need not require
understanding its causal origins to be useful, but only that impending change is likely
along the phenomenon’s baseline.
In Chapter 3, Neil Johnson’s Red Queen Hypothesis is presented and critiqued.
In 2011, Johnson offered up a solution to the policy relevant question for determining the
next attack with an extrapolated model constructed from casualty data for the wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq and several terrorist campaigns. In doing so, he concludes an
insurgency’s trajectory is based solely on the dynamic relationship between insurgents
and coalition military forces as measured by the frequency and escalation of hostile
attacks.17 In effect, Johnson proposes insurgent and coalition military interactions are
analogous to the Red Queen Hypothesis as presented by evolutionary biology and penned
by Lewis Carroll in Through the Looking Glass. In presenting Johnson’s work, this paper

17

Johnson et al. 2011b

8

will structure critiques along the policy, methodological and theoretical implications
brought forth by Johnson’s model.
Ultimately, this paper rejects the major findings offered by the Red Queen
Hypothesis and proceeds with an alternate study presented in Chapter 4. Using the same
model and data described in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 begins with a novel research
design for exploring how to recognize impending ‘game changers.’ Introducing distinct
breakpoints into the Red Queen Hypothesis demonstrates how temporal aggregation
influences the overall results. In effect, the alternate study design proposed and executed
here provides an alternative perspective on the same phenomenon under observation
using identical datasets. This research design examines hostile attacks for nine individual
Iraqi Provinces between 2003 and 2010 across two phases, each phase being
characterized by a distinct breakpoint.18 Of note, two categories of breakpoints are
examined in this study. Indications-driven breakpoints are introduced based on
observable changes in the phenomenon. For reasons that will be explained in greater
detail in Chapter 4, the indications-driven breakpoint is established based upon the
minimum value attained by the cumulative moving average for the frequency in hostile
attacks. An event-date breakpoint, however, is established at a given point in time
deemed relevant to how the phenomenon progresses in the future. For purposes of this

18

Iraq has a total of 18 provinces, however, only nine are examined in the original study or the alternate
research described in this paper.

9

study, an event-date breakpoint is established at 1 January 2007 to capture the decision to
increase troop levels in what has become popularly known as “The Surge.”19
In chapter 5, results and implications are discussed based upon the alternate study
described in the previous chapter. Of note, three main findings are presented. First, the
study’s results show that the Iraq Insurgency behaved differently during periods of
escalation and de-escalation. Secondly, the results demonstrate sub-national variance
across individual provinces in Iraq. Thirdly, there appears to be a scale invariant nature
for how hostile attacks escalate that is independent of a particular weapon system.
Introducing distinct breakpoints revealed departures from the baseline trajectory
established by the aggregate extrapolation model. The key implication is that introducing
distinct breakpoints allows for novel findings to be derived that would otherwise be
masked when the phenomenon is viewed in aggregate.
In chapter 6, the paper concludes by considering the consequences for the overall
policy, methodological and theoretical implications regarding the alternate study
presented in this paper. After reviewing the findings discussed in Chapter 5 for what can
be definitively concluded, policy-relevant claims are put forth that form the basis for a
future research agenda. Here, preliminary findings are presented for examining the
Afghanistan Insurgency following the methodology used in the alternate study. In
summarizing the discussion on recognizing ‘game changers,’ this paper will offer
recommendations for how to best utilize the knowledge of impending change.

19

President George W. Bush’s 2007 troop level increase is commonly known as “The Surge” and involved
adding an additional five brigade combat teams to forces fighting in Iraq. See Bush 2007. For an overview
of how these military forces were employed as part of a larger strategy beginning in 2007, see Kagan 2009.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the logic of using aggregated
extrapolation models for the purposes of forecasting across disciplines. In discussing
forecasts across meteorology, seismology and intelligence this section will construct the
policy, methodological and theoretical implications relevant to the particular
extrapolation model examined in this paper. Examining meteorology, this paper will
trace the theoretical discussion regarding the transition from ‘deterministic short-range
numerical weather prediction (NWP)’ to a stochastic-dynamic view widely practiced
today. A review of seismology will emphasize the methodological implications and
challenges when developing useful forecasts with models based upon past events. Lastly,
intelligence provides a useful domain for illustrating the policy implications for using
extrapolation models to identify ‘game-changer’ events that signify a point of departure
from an established baseline trajectory along an alternate path.

Meteorology
The key goals ascribed to meteorology are the “complete understanding and
accurate prediction of atmospheric phenomena.”1 While the methods and technology
have evolved over time, the goals remain the same. In exploring meteorology as an
illustrative domain for extrapolation models, this section will highlight how
1

“Glossary of Meteorology” 2000, 489

11

methodological developments were driven by theoretical evolutions and conclude with
the relevant policy implications.
Within the United States, a total of nine centers comprise the National Centers for
Environmental Predictions (NCEP) under the auspices of the National Weather Service
(NWS) charged with producing national and global meteorological forecasts. Each
weather center has a specific forecasting mission; the Storm Prediction Center addresses
“tornado and severe weather” while the Aviation Weather Center forecasts “hazardous
flight conditions.”2 The National Weather Service is aided in its task by an IBM
supercomputer tasked with parsing and shaping the big data into manageable chunks for
the meteorologists.3 The technological advances and computing power have led some to
declare both theory and the scientific method to be obsolete.4 The current state of
meteorology, however, provides a convincing counter-argument. Determining one’s
behavior based upon the expected weather is, perhaps, the most common interaction a
person has with incorporating forecasts into their own lives. Yet, the weather is
frequently not what it is forecasted to be. Put another way, data alone isn’t enough to
forecast.
Initial efforts at weather forecasting relied upon deterministic aggregated
extrapolations. In short, weather forecasts were determined based upon comparing

2

“About NCEP” 2012

3

Silver 2012b

4

“The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete” 2013
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present weather conditions for a given time and space to historic patterns.5 Past behavior
was considered to be the best predictor for future action. In pointing to the limits for such
modeling, Nate Silver retells an account in which over one hundred children died of
hypothermia in Topeka, Kansas. Here, he notes, having the average temperature for a
winter day is not useful for addressing sudden blizzard conditions which ultimately led to
the children’s deaths.6 Silver’s recounting of this story is but another example
highlighting the two flaws in aggregated extrapolation models. Aggregating weather
conditions fails to identify the most relevant question in identifying discontinuity,
manifested here in a sudden blizzard, and is, furthermore, misleading in that it masks the
changing nuances in weather over the course of a given month.
Dissatisfaction with what deterministic aggregated extrapolation had to offer
meteorology led to one of its great theoretical advances. Lewis Fry Richardson opens the
preface to what became his seminal work in meteorology, Weather Prediction by
Numerical Process, with an assessment for the current state of affairs in his chosen field.
Describing the process by which current weather conditions are compared to past
conditions in the same geographic area under observation, Richardson notes that the “past
history of the atmosphere is used…as a full-scale working model of its present self.” This
process was not intellectually satisfying for Richardson, who proceeded to develop a

5

In the preface to his seminal work on meteorology, Weather Prediction by Numerical Process,
Richardson describes this method such that “past history of the atmosphere is used…as a full-scale working
model of its present self.” Richardson 1965, xi
6

Silver 2012b
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novel methodology largely inspired by how differential equations were incorporated into
the Nautical Almanac.7
Two important points are worth noting here. First, Lewis Fry Richardson offers a
unique conceptual bridge for the purposes of this paper. Not only does his work in
meteorology provide a useful illustrative domain for aggregated extrapolation models, in
general, but his later work on the study of deadly conflict informs the specific model
examined in this paper.8 Secondly, Richardson’s contribution described here was not an
immediately accessible and applicable method for weather forecasting. Instead, his work
is known for providing the theoretical foundations for a dynamical approach to
meteorology years before the technological innovations in computers would make the
work feasible.9 The ‘forecasting factory’ first imagined by Richardson is manifested in
today’s meteorological centers.10 As noted earlier, weather forecasts are improving in
accuracy over time.11 The policy implications for this are clearly evident when
examining government responses to severe weather conditions.

7

Richardson 1965, xi

8

Richardson’s work on armed conflict will be explored in greater detail later in this paper. See Richardson
1960, Clauset, Young and Gleditsch 2007.
9

After a failed attempt to accurately deduce weather conditions for a past date using his methodology later
captured in Weather Prediction by Numerical Process, Richardson described what he imagined would be
needed to accomplish the necessary computations. By his own estimations, some 64,000 computers with
an ability to calculate “perhaps ten times faster than he himself had done” would be required. Richardson
1965, vi-vii.
10

Cox 2002, 157
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Here, accuracy is defined as comparing the weather forecast with observed weather conditions. See
Silver 2012a, 131-132 or Eric Floeher’s weather forecast accuracy website www.forecastadvisor.com,
Floehers 2012.
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Preparations for Hurricane Sandy were made possible because of the most stateof-the art weather forecasting available coupled with updated lessons in emergency
management practices.12 Even still, the estimated cost to the Northeastern United States
following the storm are estimated at $20 Billion for property damage alone.13 Were the
storm to hit landfall without prior warning and preparation, the costs would have been
significantly more damaging. Here, meteorology may provide one last useful lesson
regarding forecasts and extrapolation models. They can and do improve with time.14

Seismology
In spite of the USGS official position that discounts the possibility for accurately
predicting future earthquakes, there are several ambitious efforts to do so. One such
endeavor is the Collaboratory for the Study of Earthquake Predictability (CSEP). The
CSEP is interested in two key objectives that broadly relate to this paper’s examination of
extrapolation models. First, CSEP seeks to address how to best conduct and evaluate
“scientific prediction experiments.” Secondly, CSEP is interested in the intrinsic
predictability for the earthquake rupture process.15 Similarly, this paper is interested in
how to best identify future outcomes and explores a possible method based upon the
intrinsic predictability for the phenomenon under observation—in this case, hostile
attacks in Iraq.
12

Samenow 2012

13

“Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm” 2013

14

Kerr 2012

15

“Collaboratory for the Study of Earthquake Predictability” 2012
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A leading approach for earthquake prediction can be placed under the category of
“pattern-recognition techniques.” Following the same mantra for extrapolation identified
in this paper’s introduction, pattern-recognition techniques operate under the assumption
that past behavior is the best predictor for future action. The question then becomes a
matter of determining which past behavior is, in fact, the key driving force for
extrapolating future events. Or, put another way, what patterns are relevant for predicting
an earthquake outcome? It is at this decision point in which the seismology field remains
divided. Contending prediction models for identifying the next big earthquake have at
various times proposed that a calm before the storm, or “precursory quiescence,” and
heightened activity, or “precursory upsurge,” serve as useful predictors.16 Accounting
for both is contradictory. Yet, each case proceeded from a positivist methodology and,
therefore, some form of observation into the key driving forces deemed relevant to the
target phenomenon. This points to one obvious and important principle for extrapolation
models, which is to use domain knowledge in structuring the forecast.17 Domain
knowledge is a subset of contextual information and is comprised of the explanatory
factors responsible for influencing a forecast.18 Conflicting accounts regarding which
variables are explanatory factors, as is the case in seismology, leads to the diversified
approaches in attempts to extrapolate the phenomenon over time.
Another key principle that relates to prediction models generally is that there must
be a method for determining how useful a given model is in forecasting future events.
16

Hough 2010, 142

17

Armstrong 2001, 221

18

Ibid., 774
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Described elsewhere as being concerned with “wins and losses,” critics of earthquake
prediction point to the field’s losing record by way of discounting current methods.19
The Keilis-Borok method is one such model that gained notoriety for its supposed
winning streak, only to later come under scrutiny when its record was more closely
examined. Vladimir Keilis-Borok led the development of the M8 algorithm that identifies
regional seismic activity as a key driving force for future seismic activity.20 While the
Keilis-Borok method is sufficiently complex, its central proposition is that past seismic
activity is the best predictor of future seismic activity. Keilis-Borok gained notoriety for
his prediction of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Critics of earthquake prediction point
to the limited utility in methods that accurately identify historic events, sometimes called
‘postdiction,’ but are incapable of predicting future events.21 What made Keilis-Borok’s
1989 prediction significant for many is that he did so prior to the earthquake striking
Loma Prieta. The question remained, however, whether Keilis-Borok’s prediction was
one of scientific technique or luck.22 Since the 1989 prediction, an evaluation of the track
record for Keilis-Borok’s methods identified only four positive hits out of twenty-four
predictions.23
Although a statistical bust, the Keilis-Borok method provides several
methodological implications that speak directly to this paper’s conversation on the two
19

Silver 2012a, 77

20

Hough 2010, 143

21

Ibid., 145

22

Kerr 1991

23

Zechar 2008, 4
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flaws for aggregated extrapolation models. Attempts at earthquake prediction, although
demonstrated here as inconclusive, directly address the first flaw by searching for
discontinuity. Earthquakes are, in effect, those instances whereby present action breaks
from past behavior. The Keilis-Borok method avoids the second flaw in that it does not
aggregate temporally or across event data. Two additional methodological lessons taken
from seismology are worth reiterating here. First, domain knowledge shapes how the
model is constructed and subsequently extrapolated. Disagreement over how a
phenomenon progresses over time necessarily results in distinct extrapolation models.
Secondly, as an applicable principle for forecasts generally, evaluative measures should
be emplaced to assess how effective the methods are for predicting future outcomes.
Seismology offers one last narrative which transitions the conversation on
extrapolation models to that of policy implications. In late 2012, six Italian scientists and
a government official were convicted in a court of law for manslaughter in the wake of a
2009 earthquake in L’Aquilla, Italy which had resulted in over 300 deaths.24 The core
argument for the prosecution is that the seven defendants failed to provide adequate
warning to the people of L’Aquilla and, furthermore, in public statements prior to the
earthquake downplayed the possible risk of a future disaster. To some, it appeared as
though the government officials provided a deterministic answer by stating there would
not be a big earthquake in response to a probabilistic question on the likelihood of
occurrence. Critics of the trial conflates the verdict with the conclusion that failed
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predictions are tantamount to criminal activity.25 Elsewhere, the critics’ conversation has
played out in asking when a forecast is wrong.26 As will be discussed in the following
section on strategic intelligence, a deterministic extrapolation model is wrong when
present action is no longer explainable by past events. Or, put another way, an
extrapolation model is wrong when it answers the right question by identifying
discontinuity for the phenomenon under observation.

Intelligence
The intelligence field illustrates the policy implications for extrapolation
modeling. Intelligence is information that has been collected, processed, and narrowed to
meet the policymaker’s needs.27 Policymakers, in turn, use intelligence to take action in
the present so as to shape future events. Currently in its fifth installment, the Global
Trends report provides a prime example for how forecasting and extrapolation are best
used in the service of policy. Published by the National Intelligence Council, the Global
Trends report looks fifteen to twenty years into the future to identify the baseline
trajectories for those trends deemed critical to United States national security interests.
Its most recent publication, Global Trends 2030, identifies four such ‘megatrends’ in
individual empowerment, diffusion of power, demographic patterns and the
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food/water/energy nexus.28 The baseline trajectories for each of these megatrends are
meant to inform, not constrains, the policymaker. If the trajectory for a particular trend
outlined in the Global Trends report is in accordance with US national interests,
policymakers should pursue a course of action that reinforces the driving forces behind
this trend. If, however, the trajectory threatens US national interests, policymakers
should proceed with a course of action to bolster against the changes implicit in the given
trend.29 After identifying the baseline trajectory, the key question then becomes how to
identify when the trend departs from its path. This section will examine the use of
indicators and indications in extrapolation models within the Intelligence Community to
draw policy implications for how to identify when present action is no longer explainable
by past behavior.
Spread across three volumes, Cynthia Grabo wrote the first professional
handbook on strategic warning in the midst of the Cold War.30 Following the September
11th, 2001 terrorist attacks the first two volumes were declassified and released for public
dissemination. In the wake of strategic surprise, a high demand was placed on literature
that spoke to the possible means by which changes in the operating environment may be
identified.31 Indicators and indications are the mainstay of warning intelligence, a subset
of the larger intelligence enterprise concerned with two main functions—the continual
monitoring for routine or baseline trajectories and the points of departure that may signal
28
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an exceptional crisis.32 Here, an indicator is defined as the “known or theoretical step”
that a phenomenon may proceed upon that suggests a previously-identified alternate
trajectory. An indication is defined as information that verifies any of these steps are
being executed. The distinction between indicators and indications is one of “expectation
and reality.”33
Although Grabo does not explicitly state it in her work, warning intelligence is
essentially the construction of a conceptual model as described by Robert Clark in
Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach. The intent of the conceptual model is
to forecast when and how a phenomenon under observation may undergo change, along
previously assessed courses of action.34 Seen as such, warning intelligence as a
conceptual model is best viewed as an extrapolation based upon the assumption that past
behavior is the best predictor of future action. Displaying the baseline trajectory is
necessary to establish detectable change in the observed phenomenon, thereby
responding to the first flaw described in this paper by identifying discontinuity. As such,
the model is not a prediction of what will happen, but a forecast of future action based on
the assumption that all key driving forces remain constant without the addition or
subtraction of new forces upon the phenomenon. The distinction may be subtle in
explanation but is significant in its policy implications. The world is a complex and
dynamic system where change is certain. The question then becomes not whether a trend
will change, but in what ways the key driving forces will alter a phenomenon’s trajectory
32
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over time. Taken as such, the departure from the baseline trajectory is a ‘game-changer’
event, the specifics of which may be unknowable but whose occurrence should be
continually observed for in accordance with previously established indications.
Conceptually, the term ‘game-changers’ as used in this paper shares a common
definition with its usage in the Global Trends 2030 report. Game-changers are those
forces that lead the phenomenon under observation to depart from its established baseline
trajectory and to proceed along an alternate course of action. The Global Trends 2030
report identifies a total of six game-changers that the National Intelligence Council
determined will influence how the megatrends proceed over time in shaping future
events.35 Each game-changer is presented within a framework of identifying its present
state, a narrative describing how the game-changer may depart from the established
trajectory, and a plausible future state. Perhaps beyond the scope for the Global Trends
report series, but a central focus for this paper, is the question of how to identify an
impending game-changer. Methodologically, this entails establishing a series of
indications to identify points of departure along alternate trajectories. Practically
speaking, this process entails conceptualizing what alternate scenarios a given
phenomenon may proceed along when exposed to the game-changer’s influencing power.
From a policy standpoint, the question remains as to what course of action to proceed
along upon identifying the phenomenon’s changing direction.
One final point on game-changers is that singular departures from the baseline
trajectory do not, in of themselves, present an alternate path from which the phenomenon
is set to proceed. Instead, the singular data point may be a statistical improbability, or an
35
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outlier. Recent literature, however, suggests that at least some rare yet large events
should actually be considered a probability and not an outlier. Aaron Clauset and Ryan
Woodard examine worldwide global terrorism data from 1968 to 2007 and conclude that
an event similar in scale to the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks had an 11-35%
probability in occurring.36 Although the methodological processes by which Clauset and
Woodard come to their conclusions relies upon probabilistic modeling, instead of
deterministic extrapolations as examined in this paper, the policy implications are
applicable, nonetheless. As noted in the previous section on seismology, the model’s
construction shapes its outcomes and, by extension, establishes what instances constitute
a continuous departure from the baseline trajectory. Identifying game-changers, then,
becomes a matter of detecting changes in the established baseline trajectory. Or, put
another way, indications for an impending departure from a given phenomenon’s
trajectory precede the manifestation of the game-changer. The policy implication is to
develop an alternate course of action upon receiving information that the trend is
changing, be it to capitalize upon the phenomenon’s new direction or mitigate against the
resulting consequence.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPLORING ONE EXTRAPOLATION MODEL
The purpose for this chapter is to review one aggregated extrapolation model
present in the conflict prediction literature that will later serve as the basis for a research
design proposed and executed in the following chapters.1 Specifically, this section will
illustrate the implications associated with aggregate modeling in exploring the Red
Queen Hypothesis as proposed by Neil Johnson. After providing an overview of the Red
Queen Hypothesis, this chapter will accomplish three main tasks. First, it will identify
the assumptions that must be held true for this particular aggregated extrapolation model
to be a valid depiction of the phenomenon it reports to represent. Secondly, the policyrelated and theoretical implications brought forth by the Red Queen Hypothesis will be
explored. The methodological implications will only be discussed in this chapter as
necessary to illustrate the policy-related and theoretical aspects of the Red Queen
Hypothesis, leaving a more complete discussion on the methodological components for
the following chapter on research design. Thirdly, this chapter will conclude with a
critique of this particular aggregated extrapolation model emphasizing where it departs
from the scholarly literature.
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The Scale Invariant Nature of Insurgency
On July 13, 2008 an estimated 200 Taliban fighters attacked a remote outpost in
Afghanistan guarded by a platoon of soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) and their Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts. In what would later
be described as the Battle of Wanat, 9 US soldiers lost their lives and a total of 31 were
wounded when including ANA counterparts. It was the most significant loss of life in a
single battle since the beginning of US combat operations in 2001.1 Yet, the Battle of
Wanat and a roadside bomb that kills a single soldier share common statistical traits that
would otherwise be missed were it not for a contemporary understanding of Lewis Fry
Richardson’s statistical study of deadly conflict.
In his original study on conflict, Richardson observed smaller incidents of fatal
quarrels occurred with greater frequency when compared to large-scale incidents.
Homicides occur more often than the wars responsible for much of the world’s
casualties.2 Two key observations made by Richardson in his study are directly
applicable to the Red Queen Hypothesis presented here. First, casualties play the central
role in determining the magnitude of a fatal quarrel, be it murder or war.3 Casualty data
is also used in the Red Queen Hypothesis to trace a conflict’s trajectory, however, as will
be discussed, magnitude is not considered. Secondly, Richardson’s observations present
fatal quarrels as following a power law distribution.
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Dr. Aaron Clauset and others later proved Richardson’s original study to be
applicable to terrorist attacks, appropriately coining the phrase ‘Richardson’s Law’ to
describe the scale invariant nature for the frequency and severity of terrorist events.4
Here, severity is used in the same manner as Richardson originally discussed magnitude.
The implication following ‘Richardson’s Law’ is that there exists no statistical difference
between large and small terrorist attacks, as “both are consistent with a single underlying
distribution.”5
Power law, the statistical engine for Johnson’s Red Queen Hypothesis, has seen
wide use for its reported ability to statistically justify a range of phenomenon, from
distributions in the frequency of words used in a classic novel to the number of longdistance calls received by AT&T customers in the United States.6 Whereas many
phenomenon follow a normal distribution, others possess a “heavy tail” and display a
“nontrivial amount of weight far from the distribution’s center.”7 Here, Figure 3.1 shows
a normal distribution for average male and female height. Figure 3.2 shows a power law
distribution for US city populations.8
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FIGURE3.19

FIGURE 3.210

The mean average forms the normal distribution’s center. Male and female
heights are usefully illustrated by a normal distribution, such that statements can be made
as to how a person’s height compares to the population under observation. As Figure 3.2
demonstrates, US city populations do not follow a normal distribution. Were they to do
so, large cities that account for a significant proportion of the US population would fall
outside the normal distribution. Instead, US city populations are usefully displayed by a
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power law distribution that accounts for a few events responsible for a nontrivial portion
of the phenomenon outside the distribution’s average.11 It is important to note that
simply observing an apparent power-law distribution is not sufficient for explaining the
phenomenon under observation. Instead, these observations must be coupled with a
theory responsive to the question regarding what “genuinely new insights” have been
achieved.12 For Johnson, the Red Queen Hypothesis is offered up as an explanatory
panacea to understand the heavy-tailed distribution for hostile attacks by a mechanistic
nature of insurgency as outlined in this particular extrapolation model.
With this in mind, Johnson presents his work as an important contribution to the
“operationally relevant questions of how the underlying arms race evolves over time, or
when fatal attacks might occur.”13 Assigning the Red Queen to the niche field of conflict
prediction within the broader discipline of forecasting, there remains an understandable
appeal in presenting insurgency as a simple, mechanistic model with a unidirectional
causal relationship.

Literature and Biology: Origins of the Red Queen Hypothesis
With its origins in children’s fiction literature, Leigh Van Valen presented the
Red Queen Hypothesis as a new selectionist theory in the field of evolutionary biology.
At its core, Van Valen’s proposition is that “what one species gains others lose to the
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same extent, and vice versa.”14 The hypothesis’s namesake can be traced back to Lewis
Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, where the Red Queen informs Alice that, “It takes
all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”15 Similarly, Johnson finds the
insurgent (Red Queen) and military/counterterrorism force (Blue King) are defined by a
relationship of adaptation and counter-adaptation. The Red Queen Hypothesis serves as
the theoretical driver behind Johnson’s observed pattern of escalation in insurgent
attacks.16 It does so without requiring “knowledge of specific adaptation or counteradaptation mechanisms,” thus avoiding any dialogue regarding exogenous factors such as
insurgent cell size, coalition military tactics and local population sentiments.17
Adjusting the Red Queen Hypothesis to his own ends, Johnson proposes an
insurgency’s trajectory is largely driven by the insurgent’s continual striving to kill
coalition military forces quickly and successfully. Successful repetition of the task leads
to shorter times required for the task’s completion in successive iterations.18 In doing so,
Johnson demonstrates the possibility to represent the relative advantage or disadvantage
insurgents hold to coalition military forces measured by the frequency and escalation of
hostile attacks.
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Here, a few operational definitions are in order. Hostile attacks are defined as any
insurgent activity resulting in at least one coalition military death. Frequency, expressed
as n, is measured as the time interval in days between the current and immediately
preceding hostile attack. The 1 value is the time interval in days between the first two
hostile attacks in a given province. Essentially, 1 is the starting frequency for an
insurgency in a given area. Escalation, expressed as b, is the rate at which the time
interval between consecutive hostile attacks change over time.19 A negative b value
reflects an escalating insurgency characterized by an increasing number of hostile attacks
over a set period of time, whereas a positive b value reflects a de-escalating insurgency.20

The Red Queen as a Model
Expanding upon the Red Queen’s presentation as a model, it is useful to identify
both the intended phenomenon under observation and its key driving forces. Here, the
key driving forces are identified as the frequency and escalation of hostile attacks. All
other forces that may influence the phenomenon over time are explicitly deemed
irrelevant and excluded from the modeling. Presented as a “broad-brush theory,” the Red
Queen examines the adaptation and counter-adaptation between insurgents and coalition
military forces without requiring knowledge as to the specific mechanisms.21 Factors
such as insurgent membership, coalition military technology or a local population’s
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“hearts and minds” are presumably captured in the larger dynamic between the frequency
and escalation of hostile attacks representative of the insurgency under observation.
If Johnson is correct in his aggregated extrapolation model, the Red Queen is a
useful instrument for predicting future fatal days based upon the past behavior of hostile
attacks. In fact, the prediction formula for determining a future hostile attack in a given
province need only require the time interval between the first two events.22 The policy
implications are such that decision-makers could be provided with meaningful estimates
as to an insurgency’s progression across a theater of operations, categorized down to the
provincial level. Forecasting an insurgency’s trajectory across time for a set of given
provinces would be instrumental in allocating manpower and resources to alter or
reinforce the projected outcome.23 From a methodological standpoint, the Red Queen
distills the complex nature of insurgency down to two key driving forces—the frequency
and escalation of hostile attacks. The theoretical implications for the Red Queen fall in
line with the observations that can be made for any aggregated extrapolation—namely, its
imperviousness to ‘game changers’. At its core, the Red Queen operates on the
assumption that past behavior is the best predictor of future action. It is why,
methodologically, Johnson can make claim at predicting future attacks based solely upon
the time interval between the first two attacks. In doing so, however, a key vulnerability
to the Red Queen’s logic is revealed. Not only is insurgency scale invariant, but in order
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for the Red Queen to remain a valid model, insurgency must also be temporally invariant
as well.

A Critical Look at the Red Queen Model
Critiquing the Red Queen, as the concluding section for this chapter, helpfully
begins with exploring further its theoretical implications. The dynamic relationship of
adaptation and counter-adaptation between insurgent and coalition military force is not
only captured by two key driving forces, but at a singular moment in time to be projected
across the insurgency’s existence. Although the dataset is categorized down to provincelevel, and even available for further refinement by specific mode of weapon system used,
all hostile attacks are examined across a single time series. Hostile attacks are effectively
aggregated across the temporal dimension to present a single snapshot of an insurgency.
Its methodological design prohibits its generalized theoretical claims of a “broad-brush”
approach to capture the adaptation and counter-adaptation between two opposing forces.
To illustrate this point further, Figure 3.3 is included below from the original
study, graphically displaying the relationship between 1 and b for individual Afghanistan
provinces along a best linear fit (see Figure 3.3, Box C).
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FIGURE 3.324

As presented, Figure 3.3 Box C appears to demonstrate that the frequency () and
escalation (b) of hostile attacks across 14 Afghan provinces from 2001 to 2010 occurred
along a trajectory best described by a power law function. Instead, what Box C actually
displays is a generalized relationship formed from aggregating province-level data to a
single timeframe spanning the better part of ten years. The original study is an
aggregated extrapolation model based upon historic attack data that is only able to
forecast future events insofar as their continuance along a previously established baseline
trajectory, defined in this case by a power law function. It fails to account for changes in
the observed phenomenon, hostile attacks perpetrated by an insurgent force against
coalition military, and strongly suggests the presence of unaccounted driving forces
beyond the frequency and escalation rates identified in the original study.
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From a policy standpoint, what the Red Queen may actually provide for the
decision-maker is not a prediction for the next attack, but rather a baseline trajectory for
how an insurgency may play out barring any “significant structural changes.”25 Although
not clearly stated by Johnson in his published work on the subject, the adaptation and
counter-adaptation between insurgent and coalition military force is not captured by the
model itself, but rather by comparing actual attacks against the predicted baseline
trajectory. Taken as such, the Red Queen becomes less an instrument for predicting the
next attack, and more of an assessment tool for determining whether the Blue King is
effectively adapting to Red Queen behavior.
One final policy-related critique is that severity, measured by the total number of
casualties attributed to a single hostile attack, is deliberately excluded as a key driving
force for the extrapolation modeling offered by the Red Queen Hypothesis. In response,
Johnson would likely argue that the scale invariant nature between frequency and
escalation of hostile attacks makes severity an irrelevant factor in determining the
insurgency’s trajectory. From a policy standpoint, however, the severity of hostile
attacks in a given province is instrumental in both the military and political decisionmaking process.26 Province A may experience more catastrophic attacks, instances
whereby multiple casualties are attributed to a single enemy event, and ultimately
experience a greater loss of coalition military death than Province B. Province B,
however, may have more hostile attacks overall. The Red Queen Hypothesis would, in
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this case, forecast a trajectory that leads decision-makers to believe insurgency is
progressing at a faster rate in Province B than Province A. Or, put another way, even
though the Red Queen Hypothesis observes the Iraq Insurgency at the province-level, it
fails to account for sub-national variance when examining the process by which the
phenomenon changes over time.27 Important to note is that the manner in which
insurgency is represented in by the Red Queen Hypothesis, Province B would indeed be
escalating at a faster rate than Province A. Equally important is that were the decisionmaker to rely on the Red Queen Hypothesis, they would do so with only partial
knowledge of the phenomenon, consequently failing to address the higher casualty rates
present in Province A.
Table 3.1 is included below to demonstrate the implications in removing severity
from the model. It includes the total number of hostile attacks and those attributed to
IEDs, both unfiltered and filtered for the 1-day data resolution constraint:
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Interpreting this data to account for severity can be accomplished by considering
the ‘filtered’ quantity to be the total number of days in which a hostile attack occurred,
and the ‘unfiltered’ quantity as the total number of coalition military forces killed. It is
only in observing the data in this disaggregated form that it becomes apparent that IED
attacks in Al Anbar Province were more severe than in any other province, measured as
the total number of IED casualties across the total number of fatal days.
Johnson acknowledges the data resolution time scale of 1 day in the original
research design, identifying no consequences to the study’s overall conclusions.28
Consequently, hostile attacks that occur within an individual Iraqi province on the same
calendar day are aggregated in the model such that no more than one hostile attack is
accounted for on a given day.
The constraints imposed by day-level temporal resolution appear to be a common
challenge for the study of terrorism. Aaron Clauset and Kristian Gleditsch are faced with
similar timing resolution constraints in their study of statistical patterns found in the
frequency and severity of terrorist attacks over time. Identifying a resulting inverse
frequency from the 1-day temporal resolution, Clauset and Gleditsch aggregate attacks
perpetrated by a single group to construct a severity equivalent to all individual
attributable attacks that occurred on a given day.29 What separates Johnson’s research
from that of Clauset and Gleditsch is that the latter recognize and attempt to account for
the impact of 1-day temporal resolution. It should be noted that the two papers are
examining similar but distinct phenomenon; however, the constraints imposed by the data
28
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resolution can reasonably be expected to impact the results from both studies. For
purposes of comparing results with Johnson’s original study, the research design
proposed and executed here does not account for the 1-day data resolution constraints
imposed upon it. Future research, however, would benefit from acknowledging and
accounting for the likely impact a 1-day temporal resolution has upon the study’s
results.30

Divergence between the scholarly literature and the Red Queen
Having presented Johnson’s framework for the Red Queen Hypothesis examined
in this paper, it is necessary to highlight where his explanation diverges from the existing
literature on insurgency and state – non-state actor dynamics. Models are meant to be
useful representations of reality. The Red Queen Hypothesis, however, possesses three
main lines of departure from the scholarly work on insurgency that consequently distorts
its own purported representation. Conceivably, these departures from the literature would
be operationally irrelevant were the Red Queen Hypothesis to accurately forecast future
hostile attacks. A central premise for this paper, however, is that the original study fails
due to two inherent flaws in aggregated extrapolation models. The alternate study
described in the following chapters demonstrates how introducing distinct breakpoints
leads to findings that would be otherwise masked when the entire phenomenon is viewed
in aggregate.
Here, the Red Queen Hypothesis’s departure from the scholarly literature is
presented for two reasons. The alternate study, using the same dataset as the original
30
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study, necessarily incorporates the same divergences from the literature. Acknowledging
where the study diverges from the scholarly literature contextualizes the subsequent
findings and informs the reader on how these decisions in construction shape and
constrain the policy implications.
The first divergence from the literature is that the Red Queen Hypothesis fails to
account for any role the local population may play in an insurgency campaign. Broadly
speaking, there are two competing paradigms for how to execute a counterinsurgency.
Both, however, rely upon the local population. Enemy-centric counterinsurgency, at its
core, proceeds with the assumption that “war is war” and the purpose of war is to defeat
the enemy force.31 Critics would point to the American experience in Vietnam with its
emphasis on attrition as a blunt example of an enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy.
There is a contemporary and more nuanced repackaging of this strategy to be found in the
targeted killing campaign currently being executed by the Obama Administration through
the use of special operations and unmanned drone strikes.32 Even this strategy, however,
uses human intelligence (HUMINT) collected from the local population in order to
prosecute its mission to disrupt the enemy network’s ability to effectively operate.33 In
an enemy-centric counterinsurgency paradigm, the local population is still a necessary
stakeholder that influences the dynamic between insurgent and counterinsurgent.
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Population-centric counterinsurgency is the other campaign paradigm, and as the
name suggests, places the local population at the center of its strategy. Presented through
the lens of conventional military doctrinal terms, David Kilcullen relays the oft-cited
dilemma facing a counterinsurgent force tasked with killing the enemy. Enemy forces
must be ‘fixed,’ or prevented from moving for a specified period of time, before they can
be effectively destroyed.34 Completing this task is problematic when faced with an
opposing force that is not tied to physical terrain like a conventional army. Instead, so
the population-centric strategy offers, the counterinsurgent must ‘fix’ the insurgent force
by separating them from the local population. It is, as Mao Tse-Tung observed, to
‘separate fish from water.’35 Separating the insurgent from the local population narrowly
focuses on the insurgency’s necessity to garner its support for political power, which
broadly speaking, remains the insurgent’s goal.36 Whereas the enemy-centric approach
may be seen as a mostly military endeavor, a population-centric approach emphasizes the
primacy of civilian power.37
Taken to its extreme interpretation, Johnson’s presentation is a refutation of
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. It is to say that winning hearts and minds
is irrelevant to the outcome of an insurgency campaign, instead focusing solely on the
insurgent-coalition military dynamic as measured by the frequency and escalation of
hostile attacks. In a September 2011 working paper, Johnson discussed the interrelated
34
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dynamic between insurgents (Red Queen), coalition military forces (Blue King) and the
local population (Green). Yet, neither the relationship between 1 and b nor the
mathematical expression Johnson provides for the Red Queen Hypothesis incorporate the
local population.38 Johnson justifies this decision by arguing the local population can be
expressed as a passive background that receives the impact of hostile attacks but does not
actively influence either of the other parties.39 This is however an unconvincing position
when the only variable observed is hostile attacks measured by coalition military
fatalities. Only concerned about the frequency and escalation of hostile attacks measured
by coalition military casualties, the Red Queen Hypothesis appears to be more closely
representing an enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. As such, the Red Queen
Hypothesis may capture certain aspects pertaining to how insurgents and military forces
interact, but does so at a sacrifice. Insurgency is a multistakeholder endeavor between
the insurgent, local population, host-nation security force, and coalition military in cases
where an external intervention occurs.40 The Red Queen Hypothesis, however, reduces
insurgency to a bilateral affair between two opposing sides.
In this vein, the second main line of departure identified here is the failure to
address more than two parties engaged in a particular conflict. This is of particular
concern when examining instances whereby external intervention is critical to the
counterinsurgency campaign under observation. Host-nation security forces play a vital
role as both a force multiplier and long-term solution in a campaign largely led by a
38
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multinational consortium of military forces.41 The Red Queen Hypothesis, however, is
only capable of accounting for a dynamic relationship between a monolithic insurgent
force and a single opposing military. This is particularly problematic when examining
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, where insurgents intents on
degrading the perceived legitimacy of the national government view host-nation security
forces as the preferred target for attack.42 Furthermore, host-nation security forces
possess inferior military capabilities in comparison to the external coalition military
intervention force, presenting them as the more desirable target for attack. It is possible
that the absence of both local population and host-nation security forces from the Red
Queen Hypothesis may be due to a lack of available datasets. Removing them from the
model, however, should be done with a caveat that informs the readership as to what
constrained findings they may take from the study. Instead, the Red Queen is presented
as a “broad-brush theory” that sufficiently captures all critical components for an
insurgency campaign.43 It is in this regard that the scholarly literature disagrees.
Thirdly, the organizational group dynamics presented in the Red Queen
Hypothesis fail to address the scholarly literature on government actors and dissidents.
The Red Queen Hypothesis presupposes a singular action between the coalition military
forces and insurgent. The broader literature on government and dissident forces,
however, looks at conflict and cooperation dynamics so as to capture changes in behavior
over time. Here, Stephen Shellman’s work captures the scholarly literature on
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government and dissident behavior using a similar logical framework as is done in this
paper. Shellman examines sequential processes for conflict and cooperation between
government and dissident forces over time by disaggregating event data. In doing so, he
explores how “government behavior influences dissident behavior and how dissident
behavior influences government behavior” in the decisions made by each respective party
regarding whether to proceed with conflict and cooperation at a given point in time.44
Additionally, the Red Queen falls victim to the notion of false borders. The
phenomenon under observation is insurgency, geographically bounded along provincial
lines. Hostile attacks are categorized at the provincial level, presupposing that the
insurgency under observation is similarly constrained by the same borders. In reality,
insurgent forces are less constrained by lines on a map that symbolize political
boundaries and are, instead, restricted by geographic terrain features.45
An examination of Shellman’s work provides two distinct divergences from the
Red Queen Hypothesis and the study proposed in the following chapter. First,
Shellman’s work reflects the scholarly literature’s concern with a range of activities with
which government and dissident forces may proceed. Violent and non-violent conflict or
cooperation are examined as choices that a government or dissident may proceed with at
a given decision point.46 This government – dissident dynamic is absent both in the Red
Queen Hypothesis and in the alternate study proposed in the following chapter. In part,
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For further discussion on insurgency and the notion of false borders, see Galula 2006 and Salehyan 2011.
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For further discussion on a sequential testing of competing theories regarding repression and violence in
government–dissident behavior, see Moore 1998
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this is because the insurgency campaign modeled in the Red Queen Hypothesis operates
under the assumption that insurgents will continue to attack coalition military forces as
quickly and effectively as possible.47 Consequently, any measured changes in the
frequency and escalation of hostile attacks does not provide an alternate behavior with
which the coalition military force or insurgents may be proceeding. Or, put another way,
a measured decline in hostile attacks in the Red Queen Hypothesis does not suggest the
insurgents have chosen to engage in cooperative measures with the coalition military
forces.
Secondly, Shellman’s primary work on government and dissident dynamics
disaggregates event data, whereas the study proposed here proceeds with temporal
disaggregation. In doing so, Shellman is capable of examining “the sequences of
interaction that escalate conflict and sequences of events that de-escalate conflict and
give rise to cooperation.”48 Disaggregating event data becomes necessary in order for
Shellman to accomplish the first task—examining the process by which government and
dissident forces influence each other’s behavior along a conflict-cooperation dynamic.
This last point highlights the shared logic with which both Shellman’s work on
government-dissident behavior and this paper proceed. Aggregation, be it temporally or
event-based, masks the very nuances which may indicate in what direction a
phenomenon’s trajectory is likely to travel. Elsewhere, Shellman examines the biases
generated by temporally aggregating event data. Rightfully, Shellman’s concern is that
little attention is paid as to how temporal aggregation biases the inferences drawn from
47
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those studies. It is important to note that here, still, Shellman is interested in the conflictcooperation dynamics between government and dissident forces. Regardless, temporal
aggregation should occur at an appropriate level for the phenomenon under observation.
The difficulty, Shellman notes, is that conflict between government and dissident does
not occur along an “ ‘appropriate’ (i.e., natural) unit of time.”49 Consequently, Shellman
concludes that it is necessary to test the sensitivity for a study’s results “across various
time intervals when assessing the tenability of knowledge claims.” Studies with results
that “hold across multiple levels of aggregation” should be given greater weight.50

Implications
The most significant concern for the original study remains the two flaws inherent
to extrapolation models. The Red Queen Hypothesis is an aggregated extrapolation
model that operates on the assumption that past behavior is the best predictor for future
action, incapable of identifying discontinuity with the baseline trajectory when using its
original construct. Consequently, changes in how the insurgency escalates over time are
masked by aggregation. It is important to reiterate that the three main departures from
the literature are included here to inform the reader as to how the policy implications
from the Red Queen Hypothesis and, by extension, the alternate study are constrained by
these omissions. Or, put another way, were the original study not inhibited by the two
inherent flaws for aggregated extrapolation models, it would still fail to accomplish its
stated goal. For example, when examining the Iraq Insurgency, the original study’s claim
49
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at predicting the next hostile attack would require a caveat. The Red Queen Hypothesis
would not predict the next hostile attack conducted by insurgents, but rather, the next
hostile attack targeting coalition military forces. Attacks against host-nation security
forces are unaccounted for, a limitation acknowledged to be present in the alternate study
as well.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
Ultimately, this paper rejects the major findings offered by the Red Queen
Hypothesis and proceeds with an alternate study. Using the same model and data
described in the previous chapter, Chapter 4 begins with a novel research design for
exploring how to recognize impending ‘game changers.’ In doing so, it also explores
whether escalatory campaigns, such as an insurgent-coalition military arms race, are
explainable by a power law function. Introducing distinct breakpoints demonstrates the
influence temporal aggregation has upon the original study’s results. Temporally
disaggregating the original dataset shows that the frequency and escalation of hostile
attacks follow a trajectory that extends along a power law function for only indeterminate
periods of time. This is to say that power law functions provide an acceptable goodnessof-fit for hostile attacks up until a point in time where they no longer do so. It is this
inconsistency that brings the entirety of the explanatory power offered by the Red Queen
Hypothesis into question. Instead, the study proposed and executed here provides not
only a critical methodological response to the Red Queen Hypothesis, but provides the
foundations for an alternative conversation on extrapolation models. The results from the
study presented in this paper demonstrate that introducing distinct breakpoints to
disaggregate an extrapolated trajectory reveals certain nuances that would otherwise be
masked and, effectively, leads to alternative findings.
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Disaggregating Time: Introducing Distinct Breakpoints to the Baseline Trajectory
Using the original study’s dataset for IED attacks in individual Iraqi provinces
between 2003 and 2010, the study proposed and executed here introduces distinct
breakpoints to observe how disaggregation influences the model’s representation for
insurgency. These breakpoints can be grouped into two categories, indications-driven
and event-date breakpoints. Indications-driven breakpoints are established based upon an
observable change in the phenomenon’s behavior, while an event-based breakpoint is
established at a given point in time deemed significant and relevant to the phenomenon.
Here, it is important to note two points regarding the decision to use the Iraq
dataset. First, the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) presents a complete
dataset for interpretation spanning a significant portion of the conflict from the 2003
invasion to the 2010 drawdown.1 Whereas combat operations in Afghanistan remaining
ongoing as of this paper’s writing, using the Iraq dataset allows for observations to be
made regarding the conflict’s trajectory in its entirety.2 To avoid a selection bias, Phase 1
and Phase 2 testing are also conducted for all hostile attacks in the same nine Iraqi
provinces to ensure results are not limited to a specific mode of attack—even one

1

Operation Iraqi Freedom concluded in August 2010 with the US troop level reduction to 50,000. The
continued US Military presence beyond August 2010 falls under Operation New Dawn. See Jaffe, 2010.
2

Although Johnson describes the dataset for the original study to range from 2003 to the 2010 drawdown,
the terminating datapoints for the Iraqi provinces under observation are dated late 2009 through early 2010.
There are, consequently, hostile attacks which occurred in the final months of Operation Iraqi Freedom
which are neither included in the original study or the one proposed and executed in this paper. The
number of hostile attacks excluded are small enough it is not believed to have any meaningful impact on
results.
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responsible for the most US casualties.3 Secondly, Johnson identifies the Iraq Insurgency
as the only campaign observed in his study that includes both escalatory and deescalatory components.4 Consequently, as will be explained below, the original study
contains an indications-driven breakpoint where Johnson identifies the insurgency to be
de-escalatory and will form the basis for Phase 1 in the study proposed here.
Only concerned with the escalatory phase of the insurgency, Johnson calculates a
cumulative moving average (CMA) for  values between each hostile attack in a given
province. Identifying the “minimum value attained by the cumulative moving average
(CMA) of tau,” Johnson establishes this as the endpoint for his study, effectively
censoring the data at the point in which subsequent CMA values increase over time.5 The
power law functions for each individual Iraqi province are only calculated from 1 to this
defined minimum value, effectively capturing the pre-n shift moment. Collectively, these
indications-driven breakpoints span an approximate 33-month period ranging from May
2005 to February 2008.6
In the original study, Johnson states that the power law function provides up to a
70% improvement over an exponential fit for three-quarters of all provinces under

3

While IEDs caused more US casualties than any other mode of attack in Iraq, bullets proved to be the
most lethal. Here, lethality was determined by calculating the percentage of casualties when compared to
the total number of instances, accounting for those wounded in action. See “More Attacks, Mounting
Casualties” 2007 and “Why do Bullets Kill More Soldiers in Iraq?” 2012.
4

5

6

Johnson et al. 2011a, 82
Ibid. Supported Online Material (SOM) Methodologies Section
Ibid. Supported Online Material (SOM) “pre_nshift_devcurves.ods”
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observation.7 Although this observation was made in direct reference to provinces in
Afghanistan, the methodological steps are repeated in this alternate study for the Iraq
Insurgency on the basis that the central premise should hold true. If the Red Queen
Hypothesis is to remain valid, a power law function should perform better than an
exponential fit for all time series presented in this alternate study. Otherwise, a power
law function is no longer a sufficient explanation for the frequency and escalation of
hostile attacks over time.
The research design in this paper applies a common methodology across two
empirical testing phases. For both phases in this paper’s study, a total of 1057 unique IED
hostile attacks spanning nine provinces are examined across the two time series under
observation—referenced as T1 and T2 for Phase 1, T1pre-2007 and T2post-2007 for Phase 2.
Each time series is, in effect, separated by a distinct breakpoint introduced to test the
effects of temporal disaggregation for the entire phenomenon under observation—in this
case, the Iraq Insurgency from 2003 to 2010. Power law functions and exponential fits
are calculated for each designated time series in the Iraq IED dataset separated by distinct
breakpoints. The resulting pearson r-squared value is then compared against an r-squared
value for an exponential fit applied to the same province. The equation used is: (rsquaredPLF – r-squaredexponential)*100. Instances where the exponential fit outperforms the
power law function use the following equation, so as to keep all results positive: (rsquaredexponential – r-squaredPLF)*100.8

7

Johnson et al. 2011a, 81

8

See Appendices A and B for individual province-level calculations across both Phase 1 and Phase 2
observations.
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If the original study’s observations are to be valid, the most immediate policy
implication is that the Iraq War is the only counterinsurgency to be effectively won where
winning is defined as slowing down the rate of hostile attacks. This is significant in that
the original study included data for the war in Afghanistan, Hezbollah, and other global
terrorist attacks.9 Here, escalation and de-escalation refer to the rate at which the average
frequency () changes over time. This subject will be engaged in more detail in Chapter 5
where the results from the alternative study are presented. For now, it is only necessary
to consider that there may be escalatory and de-escalatory components in other
insurgency campaigns that are masked by the aggregated extrapolation modeling.10
Identifying these nuances in the conflict’s trajectory can provide meaningful alternative
understandings for the campaign.

Phases and Time Series Explained
In Phase 1, the power law function for the post-n shift moment is calculated for
purposes of comparison. The Iraq dataset, bifurcated by the CMA minimum value,
presents two distinct time series for evaluation. Only one, however, is observed in the
July 2011 Science article as Johnson cites his study to be solely interested in escalation.11
Consequently,  calculations and b values for T1 are included as part of the ‘pre-n shift’
9

As previously noted, datasets for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were obtained from casualty listings
provided by www.icasualty.org. All other terrorism datasets were obtained from the Chicago Project on
Security and Terrorism (CPOST) and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). A
full listing of datasets employed by Johnson in the original study can be found in the Supported Online
Material (SOM).
10

An example for insurgencies that possess de-escalatory and escalatory segments is explored further in
Chapter 6, specifically looking at Zabul Province in Afghanistan.
11

Johnson et al. 2011a, 82
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dataset found in the supported online material. This paper’s research design presents this
pre-n shift moment, defined as T1, and compares power law functions for the post-n shift
moment, defined as T2. Or, put another way, Phase 1 consists of introducing the
indications-driven breakpoint established at the minimum value attained by the
cumulative moving average into the entire dataset for the Iraq Insurgency.
Phase 2 in the research design separates the Iraq IED event dataset into two
distinct time-series using 1 January 2007 as an event-date breakpoint. The 2007 decision
to ‘surge’ five additional brigade combat teams to Iraq while extending those units
already deployed in theater is cited as a key policy decision responsible for quelling the
escalatory violence that had come to characterize the conflict.12 Conceivably, a conflict’s
trajectory will change direction over time, perhaps multiple times and in significant ways.
Establishing the 2007 troop increase as the Phase 2 breakpoint is useful, even though the
overall study is not concerned with providing an explanatory narrative for the causal
origins to any changes in the phenomenon’s trajectory. If any changes in the
insurgency’s trajectory were to be masked by a temporal aggregation for the entire
phenomenon, establishing a breakpoint on 1 January 2007 provides a strong opportunity
for the nuances to be made apparent. Consequently, an event-date breakpoint is
established at 1 January 2007 to separate the Iraq data into pre-surge and post-surge
hostile attacks, defined here as T1pre-2007 and T2post-2007. Power law functions and
exponential fits are calculated for both time-series and pearson r-squared values are then
compared.

12

See Bush 2007 and Kagan 2009
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The  values for the filtered Iraq dataset are calculated by determining the number
of calendar days between a hostile event and the next subsequent attack. For instance,
calculating the n value for the casualty-producing IED attack that occurred on 31
January 2004 in At-Tamim province requires identifying the next subsequent attack—in
this case, 4 April 2004. The number of calendar days between these two successive
attacks is 64 and, therefore, the n value for the 31 January 2004 IED event is 64.13
Whereas n is the “interval between the (n-1)’th and n’th fatal day, 1 is the “time interval
between the first 2 days with coalition military fatalities.”14 The n values for each
individual Iraqi province were plotted on a log-log axis.15 The b value for the time period
under observation in each Iraqi province was derived from the power law function, n =
1n-b. The introduction of distinct breakpoints establishes a new 1 value for each time
series under observation and effectively alters the resulting trajectory in a non-systematic
manner, bringing into question the overall implications originally proposed for the Red
Queen.
Were a province’s first casualty to be erroneously labeled as a hostile attack, it
would be to effectively introduce an arbitrary breakpoint, altering the phenomenon’s
trajectory. The consequences for such an error are observable in the original study when
examining Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. The first hostile attack reported in Kandahar
is dated 15 April 2002 and identified as an IED attack. A review of the obituaries for the
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See Appendices A and B for individual province-level log-log scatter plot graphs.
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four service members killed on this date reveals the cause of death to be the mishandling
of unexploded ordinance.16 This is important in that the 15 April 2002 event does not
meet the operational definition for a hostile attack, since the event was not attributed to
enemy action. A review of the IED attacks in Kandahar Province which accounts for the
need to adjust the 1 value from ‘1132’ to ‘89’ (the next hostile attack reported in
Kandahar Province is dated 21 May 2005) results in an 11% reduction in the overall
power-law progress-curve improvement over an exponential fit.17 While a small number
of coalition military casualties may erroneously be attributed to enemy action, there is no
indication of a selection bias in this error and the numbers are likely low enough that the
study’s overall implications are not impacted—barring one exception. The 1 value is
critical in establishing the Red Queen’s baseline trajectory for a province’s insurgency.
As a matter of due diligence, all entries for the nine Iraqi Provinces used in this study
were vetted using obituaries in order to verify the cause of death was attributed to enemy
action.

Summary
The methodology for calculating the power law function, exponential fit and
comparing the pearson r-squared values remains constant across both testing phases. The
resulting 1057 hostile attacks spanning nine provinces are examined across both phases in
this study. Separately, Phase 1 and Phase 2 testing was conducted for the same nine
provinces using all 1936 hostile attacks reported during the observation time to ensure
16
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results were robust. The empirical testing addresses the decontextualized approach in
methods and theory with which Johnson proceeded in his original study. It does so by
introducing distinct temporal contexts that allow for opportunities with which exogenous
factors, masked in the original study, may influence the relationship between frequency
and escalation. Based upon the study design, the 1 value can be expected to change at the
breakpoint, reflecting a ‘resetting’ of the power-law function. Instances where the
exponential fit is shown to outperform the power law function, however, may be
indicative of exogenous factors influencing the relationship between frequency and
escalation. Such results would question the validity in the explanatory value provided by
the Red Queen Hypothesis, effectively demonstrating how temporally disaggregating the
original dataset along distinct breakpoints influences the trajectory’s outcome. This
study, as noted in the introduction, would not provide a narrative for the causal origins to
these changes. It would, however, provide the opportunity to identify nuances in the
phenomenon that may be indicative of impending ‘game changers’ using an extrapolation
model.
Table 4.1 is included to highlight the distinct methodological differences between
the Red Queen Hypothesis and the alternative study described here:

TABLE 4.1
Red Queen Hypothesis
Temporally Aggregated from 2003 to
the minimum value obtained by the
CMA
Only examines the escalatory portion
of the campaign, or the pre-n shift
moment

Alternative Approach
Temporally disaggregated across two
distinct breakpoints, both the CMA
and 1 January 2007
Examines both escalatory and deescalatory portions of the campaign
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TABLE 4.1(Continued)
Red Queen Hypothesis
Extrapolates an insurgency’s trajectory
using the 1 value
Focuses on continuity in the baseline
trajectory and masks indications for
impending ‘game changer’ events

Alternative Approach
Resets the 1 value at each distinct
breakpoint, effectively resetting the
insurgency’s extrapolated trajectory
Highlights discontinuity in the
baseline trajectory and provides
opportunity to measure indications
for impending ‘game changer’ events
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
If Johnson was correct in his theoretical explanation and methodological testing
for the Red Queen Hypothesis, then one could expect three main findings. First, one
would expect results consistent with the original study that found a power law function to
be a better fit for hostile attacks across provinces under observation. As will be discussed
in this section, a power law function provided a better fit for hostile attacks in only five
out of nine provinces during the escalatory phase. Secondly, one would expect a power
law function to provide a better fit during the de-escalatory phase once the algorithm was
reset for the hostile attack immediately following the minimum value attained by the
cumulative moving average. Instead, results demonstrate that an exponential line
provides a consistently better fit during time-series 2 testing.1 Thirdly, one would expect
to find a scale invariant quality when comparing escalatory segments of the insurgency
across weapon systems.2
Results from this paper’s study do strongly point to three main findings. It is only
the last point, however, regarding the scale invariant quality for hostile attacks that is in
agreement with the results from the study conducted in this paper. In short, examining
the entire phenomenon as done here, challenges the findings offered in the original study.
1

See Appendix C for cross-tabulations for individual province-level performance by phase and time-series
regarding power law function and exponential fit.
2

During this study, the IED was examined as a single weapon system and compared to an aggregate for all
hostile attacks.
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First, insurgencies behave differently during periods of escalation and de-escalation. The
results show the power law function is a marginally better explanation during the
escalation phase, while the exponential fit is overwhelmingly better during the deescalatory phase. These observations strongly suggest that the Iraq insurgency’s deescalation is not strictly the reversal of the escalatory segment. Were this to be the case,
it would be expected that the power law function would provide a consistently better fit
during both escalatory and de-escalatory segments of the insurgency. The second finding
is that not all insurgencies behave the same. Three provinces are consistently better
explained by an exponential fit during the escalatory segment of the insurgency across all
phases of observation when examining IED attacks. Similarly, four other provinces are
consistently explained by a power law function during the escalatory segment of the
insurgency across all phases of observation when examining IED attacks.3 These results
imply that not all insurgencies escalate according to a single process, but rather, display
sub-national variance across provinces.4 Thirdly, there is a scale invariant quality to the
escalation segment for an insurgency that remains independent of weapon systems
employed for the hostile attacks. It is this last point, and this one alone, which is in
agreement with the findings from the original study.
In addition, these findings warrant further research as to whether event-date
breakpoints may serve as an adequate substitute for indications-driven breakpoints. This
3

The three provinces which are consistently better explained by an exponential fit during the escalatory
segment across all phases of observation when examining IED attacks are: Baghdad, Basra and At-Tamim.
The four provinces which are consistently explained by a power law function during the escalatory segment
of the insurgency across all phases of observation when examining IED attacks are: Al Anbar, Ninawa,
Qadisiyah and Salah Ad Din. It should be noted that this pattern also holds when examining all hostile
attacks for Phase 1. See Appendix C.
4
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is important because it provides the foundation for further research on how to best
identify ‘game-changers’ in a given phenomenon under observation. Furthermore, none
of the key findings outlined here could have been identified without introducing distinct
breakpoints into the entire phenomenon under observation, disaggregating the Iraq
Insurgency to reveal nuances in the baseline trajectory.

Finding1: Escalating and De-escalating behavior
As shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, a power law function provided marginally
better fit during the escalatory segment of the Iraq insurgency as defined by Time Series
1 (T1) for both phases of observation. Results for Time Series 2 (T2) for both phases of
observation show the exponential line to be an overwhelmingly better fit during the deescalatory segment. The results demonstrate the Red Queen Hypothesis is a poor
explanation for any point in time following the pre-n shift moment (shown here as T1).
Even resetting the power law function as was done in T2 for both phases of observation
does not result in a better fit during the de-escalatory segment. The implication here is
that the Iraq Insurgency behaves differently during the escalation and de-escalation
segments.
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TABLE 5.1 - Phase 1, IED attacks (Breakpoint established at minimum value attained by
CMA)*

*Qadisiyah was excluded from Phase 1, T2 testing due to limited data points leading to
inconclusive results

TABLE 5.2 - Phase 2, IED attacks (Breakpoint established at 1 January 2007)

Finding 2: Not all insurgencies behave the same
While five out of nine provinces are consistently better explained by a power law
function during the escalatory segment across all phases of observation for IED attacks,
the individual provinces differ between phases. Four provinces, however, remain constant
across both phases of observation in following a power law function explanation during
the escalatory segment of the insurgency—Salah Ad Din, Qadisiyah, Ninawa and Al
Anbar. 5

5

The five provinces that are better explained by a power law function during the escalatory phase consists
of the four identified provinces (Salah Ah Din, Qadisiyah, Ninawa and Al Anbar) plus a fifth province that
varies with each phase. For Phase 1, the fifth province better explained by a power law function is Diyala,
whereas for Phase 2 it is Babil. See Appendix C.
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A similar observation can be made about three provinces that are consistently
better explained by an exponential fit across all phases of observations—Baghdad, AtTamim and Basra.6 The observation that during the escalatory segment (T1), four
provinces are consistently explained better by a power law function while three other
provinces remain consistently better fit to an exponential explanation strongly suggests
that not all insurgencies behave the same. Instead, there is sub-national variance across
both individual provinces and groups of provinces when examining the Iraq Insurgency.
This sub-national variance is not only evident in the manner by which individual
provinces escalate, be it better explained by a power law function or exponential fit, but
can also be observed when contrasting total hostile attacks against a 1-day data
resolution.
Table 3.1 from Chapter 3 is reproduced here to demonstrate how contrasting the
total reported hostile attacks with the 1-day data resolution applied in the original study
reveal unique characteristics for individual provinces beyond just the escalatory process.
Comparing IED attacks at a 1-day resolution (filtered) against the total number of
casualties attributed to IEDs (unfiltered), some preliminary conclusions can be made
regarding IED lethality across provinces. Whereas Al Anbar may be the most lethal, with
402 casualties attributed across 222 days with reported IED attacks, Qadisiyah and Salah
Din are significantly less lethal.
Granted, the Red Queen Hypothesis examines power law functions at the
individual province level, which may be seen as to implicitly acknowledge some level of

6

It should be noted that this pattern holds across both phases for observation when examing IED attacks
and all hostile attacks. See Appendix C.
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sub-national variance. Its conclusions that a single escalatory process may be used to
explain all provinces under observation, however, are contradicted by the findings from
this paper’s study. Instead, the alternate study’s findings provide further vindication for
those scholars who wish to take sub-national variance seriously.

Further research would benefit from examining these groups of individual
provinces with similar escalatory behavior to identify different pathways by which
insurgencies may proceed over time.

Finding 3: Scale Invariance
Results from conducting Phase 1 testing for all hostile attacks suggest a scale
invariant nature for the Iraq Insurgency during the escalatory segment that is independent
of the particular weapon system. As noted in Table 5.1, five out of nine provinces are
better explained by a power law function during the escalatory segment. Similarly, Table
5.3 demonstrates that when all attacks are observed, five out of nine provinces are better
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explained by a power law function during the escalatory segment. At the individual
province level, four provinces are better explained by a power law function across both
phases, regardless of whether all attacks or only IED events were under observation—Al
Anbar, Ninawa, Diyala and Salah Ad Din. Additionally, three provinces are better
explained by an exponential fit across both phases, regardless of whether all attacks or
only IED events were under observation —Baghdad, Basra and At-Tamim. The
implication here is that while not all insurgencies behave the same, the results from this
study suggest that they maintain certain internally consistent traits. One such trait is the
scale invariant nature as observed by the internally consistent behavior for individual
provinces, regardless as to whether hostile attacks are observed in aggregate or isolated to
a particular weapon system. Further research would benefit from focusing on possible
causal mechanisms that may explain internally consistent behavior across phases of
observation.
TABLE 5.3 - Phase 1, all attacks (Breakpoint established at minimum value attained by
CMA)

Implications
While the Red Queen Hypothesis only addresses the escalatory segment of the
Iraq Insurgency, the study presented here speaks to the entire phenomenon under
observation from 2003 to 2010. By incorporating two distinct breakpoints, one
indications-driven and the other event-based, this study successfully captures a departure
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from the baseline trajectory over time. Or, put another way, this study identifies a ‘game
changer’ in the Iraq Insurgency. By examining the entire phenomenon, this study is
capable of identifying changes in the baseline trajectory whereas the Red Queen
Hypothesis is censored at the point in which the baseline trajectory is no longer
applicable. It is the point of discontinuity, captured in this study by the de-escalatory
segment (T2) across all phases of observation, which is of the utmost concern from a
policy standpoint. In this particular case, discontinuity from the baseline trajectory is the
desired policy outcome—slowing the insurgency’s frequency and escalation of hostile
attacks over time.
Testing across both phases of observation reveal similar characteristics with
policy implications directly applicable to establishing distinct breakpoints and identifying
‘game-changer’ events. It is important to remember that the methodological difference
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 testing is found in what type of distinct breakpoint was used
to separate the data. While Phase 1 testing relied upon an indications-driven breakpoint
established by identifying the minimum value attained by the cumulative moving average
for , Phase 2 testing used an event-date. Results from both phases, however, captured
similar observations regarding the phenomenon’s changing nature over time. Most
notably, testing from both phases displayed T2 results that overwhelmingly aligned with
an exponential fit over that of a power law function. The key implication here is that
both types of breakpoints were broadly successful in observing a fundamental departure
in the phenomenon’s path from its baseline trajectory—effectively identifying a ‘game
changer.’
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This is important and warrants further investigation for two main reasons. First, it
is conceivable change in a phenomenon over time may occur by unidentified means. In
such instances, developing indications to effectively capture this change may be absent or
incomplete. The Phase 2 results, however, suggest it may still be possible to identify
changes in the baseline trajectory by establishing a distinct breakpoint surrounding key
event-dates relevant to the phenomenon under observation. In the case of this study, 1
January 2007 was used to capture possible changes in the Iraq Insurgency caused by
increased troop levels with the adoption of a new strategy. Presumably, if the 2007 troop
surge had no influence over the frequency and escalation of hostile attacks in Iraq, then
there would have been no significant distinction between T1 and T2 results.

While

indications-driven breakpoints should be seen as more accurate from a methodological
standpoint, the policy implication here is that event-based breakpoints may be an
adequate substitution when the changing nature for the phenomenon under observation is
unknown.
Although not the central focus for the original study, Johnson’s use of cumulative
moving averages to effectively censor his dataset to strictly the escalatory segment in the
Iraq Insurgency warrants further investigation. Figure 5.1 displays the cumulative moving
average for the frequency of all hostile attacks measured by calendar days in Salah Ad
Din Province from 2003 to 2010.
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FIGURE 5.1: Salah Ad Din Province (All Attacks) Cumulative Moving Average for
Frequency in Hostile Attacks, 2003-2010

As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, there is an escalatory and de-escalatory segment
separated by the distinct breakpoint established at the minimum value attained by the
cumulative moving average. Whereas the CMA values followed a generally negative
trending prior to the breakpoint, a generally positive trending is observed afterwards.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, a negative trending in cumulative moving averages indicates
hostile attacks are occurring more frequently over time and therefore the insurgency is
escalating. A positive trending, therefore, indicates attacks are occurring less frequently
and that the insurgency is de-escalating. There are two key implications that can be taken
by observing the cumulative moving average charts for individual Iraqi Provinces. First,
observing the cumulative moving average for the frequency in hostile attacks for each
individual province included in the original study shows the Iraq Insurgency goes through
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a distinct escalatory and de-escalatory segment over time. Or, put another way, the Iraq
Insurgency can be broadly separated into a period of time where coalition military forces
were losing and a period of time where they were winning. The fluctuations in the
cumulative moving average likely reflect the tactical victories and defeats that can be
expected as insurgents and coalition military forces engage over time.
Second, as Figure 5.1 demonstrates by displaying the breakpoint for Salah Ad
Din, some individual provinces began to experience a declining frequency for hostile
attacks prior to the troop surge. As stated earlier, this study is interested in identifying
departures from the baseline trajectory but does not establish the causal mechanisms for
the discontinuity. It should be noted that six out of nine provinces have indication-driven
breakpoints after 1 January 2007, as shown in Table 5.4. This may be expected when one
considers the temporal lag that should be expected after implementing a new strategy.7
Further research, however, would benefit from examining why some provinces appear to
have seen a de-escalation in hostile attacks prior to either the troop surge or Sunni Arab
Awakening—broadly speaking, two common narratives for explaining declining violence
in Iraq.8

7

For further discussion on how time influences social processes, see Pierson 2004.

8

For further research that examines possible explanations for declining violence in post-2007 Iraq, see
Biddle, Friedman, and Shaprio 2012.
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TABLE 5.4: Phase 1, T1 Break Points for Individual Iraqi Provinces
IRAQI PROVINCE

DATE FOR MINIMUM VALUE ATTAINED BY
CMA (BREAKPOINT, PHASE 1, T1)

Diyala

18 June 2004

Ninawa

28 May 2005

Salah Ah Din

1 January 2006

Al Anbar

23 March 2007

Qadisiyah

14 June 2007

Babil

25 June 2007

Basra

7 August 2007

Baghdad

10 October 2007

At Tamim

12 October 2007

Ultimately, the results from this paper challenge the Red Queen Hypothesis as
they proceed to put forth policy-relevant findings. Introducing distinct breakpoints into
the entire phenomenon under observation revealed an alternate narrative for
understanding insurgency. Insurgencies do not escalate in the same way by which they
may later de-escalate. There is sub-national variance across provinces that demonstrate
not all insurgencies behave alike. In both cases, these results are reflective of changes in
the observed phenomenon over time. More tellingly, both may be considered instances
whereby past behavior is not the best predictor of future action when viewed in
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aggregate. Instead, these findings reflect departures from the baseline trajectory—
discontinuities which are not accounted for in the original aggregated extrapolation
model. The most compelling implication to be taken from these results is that
indications-driven breakpoints may provide a useful mechanism for identifying ‘game
changers.’
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Returning to the two illustrations provided in the introduction, there is a key
policy question to be found in the success and failure of extrapolations in Kunduz
Province. Is the phenomenon under observation akin to the enemy mortar team that
repeatedly attacked from the same location at the same time, or more closely aligned with
the tactical innovation displayed in the siege of the Afghan National Army recruiting
center? In one instance, short-term tactical extrapolations aided in the decision-making
process necessary to disrupt insurgent activity, whereas the latter case all but ensured
strategic surprise.
Ultimately, what this paper provides is an alternative study that examines
aggregated extrapolation models in a new light. Instead of supposing past behavior is the
best predictor for future action, this paper offers the more useful analytic query is to
actively seek out when present behavior is no longer explainable by past action. This
discontinuity represents a departure from the established baseline trajectory, effectively a
‘game changer’ event for the phenomenon under observation. Furthermore, it is only
upon disaggregating the data that nuances in the trajectory are revealed. Identifying these
changes in the established baseline trajectory over time provides an opportunity for
further research on how to best detect indicators for impending ‘game changers.’
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The central proposal made in this paper is that the introduction of distinct
breakpoints into an aggregated extrapolation model will reveal changes in the
phenomenon over time that would otherwise be masked by the baseline trajectory. This
paper has offered distinct breakpoints as a methodology for examining how a
phenomenon changes over time using two distinct techniques. Phase 1 procedures used
an indications-driven breakpoint to establish changes in the trajectory over time using
previously established measurements. Phase 2 procedures, however, used an event-based
breakpoint positioned at a point in time assessed to be significant to the phenomenon
under observation. The initial results presented by this study suggest that while
indications-driven breakpoints are more accurate in identifying impending change in the
established baseline trajectory, event-based breakpoints may provide an adequate
alternative when the nature of how the phenomenon is likely to evolve remains unknown.
Determining points of departure along an established baseline can alert policymakers to
impending change. Providing observable and measurable indicators to identify these
breakpoints, be they indications-driven or event-based, before they substantially change
the event’s trajectory is both interesting and highly relevant.
Furthermore, in doing so, this study provides key findings for the Iraq Insurgency
that are otherwise masked in the original study. The process by which the Iraq
Insurgency escalated was characteristically different than how it de-escalated.
Examining individual provinces across phases of observation revealed a level of subnational variation also not evident in the original study. Only the last finding, pointing to
the scale invariant nature for escalation in hostile attacks independent of the weapon
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system employed, falls within the explanatory framework established by the Red Queen
Hypothesis.
A key finding observed in the original study, further examined in the alternate
study described in this paper, is that the cumulative moving average for the frequency in
hostile attacks serves as an effective indication to identify change in the insurgency’s
trajectory over time. The minimum value attained by the cumulative moving average,
though the terminal endpoint for the original study, serves as a distinct breakpoint for the
alternate study that allows for observation of the entire Iraq Insurgency through both
escalatory and de-escalatory segments.
While further research is required, the findings from this study demonstrate
promising results that hold external validity for other insurgencies. An examination of
Kandahar Province in accordance with the original study is displayed in Figure 6.1.
Important to note here is that the period of observation for Kandahar is 2001 through
2010, and that the entire period of observation for Kandahar Province is one of an
escalating insurgency, as demonstrated in Figure 6.2.
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FIGURE 6.1: Kandahar Province, All Hostile Attacks 2001-2010

Whereas the Iraq Insurgency displayed distinct escalatory and de-escalatory
segments across all nine provinces under observation, hostile attacks in Kandahar reflect
a continually escalating insurgency. Or, put another way, the central policy implication
for Figure 6.2 is that coalition military forces have never been winning in Kandahar.1
While Figure 6.2 suggests coalition military forces have never been winning in Kandahar,
an examination of hostile attacks during the same time period in Zabul province offers a
different narrative.

1

Casualty data was examined for Kandahar Province from 2010 to 2012 in order to allow for any postsurge effect on the insurgency’s trajectory. Examining hostile attacks in Kandahar Province from 20012012, as well as isolating the post-surge time period of 2010-2012, revealed no change in the overall
trajectory for the escalating insurgency. It should be noted that examining hostile attacks in Helmand
Province from 2010 through 2012 revealed a de-escalating insurgency, however, when all hostile attacks
for the province were examined from 2001-2012 no such change in trajectory occurred. A possible
explanation for the observed de-escalatory segment in Helmand Province from 2010-2012 may include the
impact from Operation ‘Moshtarak,’ a major ISAF and ANSF offensive targeting the Taliban stronghold in
the city of Marjah. For more information on this operation, please see Chivers and Filkins 2010.
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FIGURE 6.2: Kandahar Province, Cumulative Moving Average for Frequency in Hostile
Attacks

As shown in Figure 6.3, hostile attacks in Zabul Province experienced distinct
periods of escalation and de-escalation. Specifically, hostile attacks 6-12 which
corresponds to September 2005 to March 2008 is a de-escalatory period for the
insurgency in Zabul.
Figure 6.3: Zabul Province, Cumulative Moving Average for Frequency in Hostile
Attacks
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This ultimately raises a key observation and an important policy implication.
First, Afghanistan displays sub-national variation when examining the frequency and
escalation of hostile attacks at the provincial level. Consequently, Zabul does not fit the
model provided in the original study since a power law function does not display better
fit than an exponential curve. Proponents of the original study may respond that the Red
Queen Hypothesis, while the superior model, does not address all cases, noting it is better
in 70% of the provinces under observation.2 Zabul, then, would fall into the 30% of
provinces that fail to be adequately explained by the Red Queen Hypothesis. This subnational variation, however, does have an important policy implication. Zabul does not
fit the Red Queen Hypothesis because, for a period of time between 2005 and 2008,
coalition military forces were winning—the insurgency was in a de-escalatory phase.
The question then becomes, did coalition military forces know they were winning in
Zabul Province at the time they were doing so? The study presented in this paper
provides the foundational research agenda to pursue the broader query presented by this
question—how to identify impending departures from the baseline trajectory.
In its present state, the study presented in this paper provides a retrospective
analysis for assessing whether a phenomenon under observation is in accordance with or
a departure from the established trajectory. Future research should be dedicated to
incorporating a predictive element into the study’s methodology. Doing so would both
be more interesting and possess greater policy implications. Ten years of armed conflict,
arguably the most collected-upon and reported war in human history, present an
opportunity for greater understanding of political violence. One of the more interesting
2

Johnson et al. 2011a, 81
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questions begins not by looking to the past to explain the future, but rather actively
seeking out when the present departs along an alternate path.
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APPENDIX A: PHASE 1 IRAQ PROVINCE-LEVEL IED ATTACKS
Al Anbar Province

82

At-Tamim Province

83

Babil Province

84

Baghdad Province

85

Basra Province1

1

British forces served as the dominant military presence in Basra up until their 2007 withdrawal.
Logically, as demonstrated by Phase 1 T2 testing, significantly reducing troop levels will necessarily
reduce the number of hostile attacks measured by coalition military casualties. See Farrell 2007.
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Diyala Province2

2

Diyala province is the only such province identified in the original study as having two minimum values
attained by the cumulative moving average. Consequently, Phase 1 testing includes time series for both
minimum values (T1 and T1A). Phase 2 testing, however, uses 1 January 2007 as a distinct breakpoint and
therefore does not include any additional time series.
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Ninawa Province3

3

Ninawa Province is the only case examined in which the observed trajectory reflects a de-escalating
insurgency prior to the breakpoint, and an escalating insurgency after the breakpoint. See also Ninawa
Province during Phase 2 testing on pg 60 (Appendix B)
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Qadisiyah Province4

4

Qadisiyah was removed from consideration when counting the total number of provinces which were best
explained by either a power law function or exponential fit during Phase 1 T2 testing due to the limited data
points.
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Salah Ad Din Province
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APPENDIX B: PHASE 2 IRAQ PROVINCE-LEVEL IED ATTACKS
Al Anbar Province

91

At-Tamim Province

92

Babil Province

93

Baghdad Province

94

Basra Province

95

Diyala Province

96

Ninawa Province

97

Qadisiyah Province

98

Salah Ad Din Province
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APPENDIX C: IRAQI PROVINCE-LEVEL RESULTS (PHASE 1 AND 2)
Tables C.1-C.4 show the Iraqi Province-Level results by phase, time series, and
weapon system (IEDs or all hostile attacks) for comparing r-2 squared values obtained
by calculating the power law function and exponential fit (see Appendix A and Appendix
B). Iraqi Provinces placed in the ‘PLF’ column were observed as having a higher r-2
squared value when a power law function was applied to the data, whereas those
provinces placed in the ‘EXP’ column maintained a higher r-2 squared value with an
exponential fit.
TABLE C.1

TABLE C.2
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TABLE C.3

TABLE C.4
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Tables C.5-C.6 provide cross-tabulated results taken from Tables C.1-C.4 for both IED
attacks and all hostile attacks.

TABLE C.5

TABLE C.6
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